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Abstract 
Over the last decade, a growing number of emerging countries has adopted inflation targeting 
as monetary policy framework. In a recent paper, Freedman and Laxton (2009) ask the 
question “Why Inflation Targeting?”. This paper empirically investigates this question by 
analyzing a large set of institutional and political factors potentially associated with a 
country’s choice of adopting IT. Using panel data on a sample of thirty inflation targeting and 
non-inflation emerging countries, for the period 1980-2006, our results suggest that central 
bank independence, policy-makers’ incentives, and characteristics of political system play an 
important role in the choice of IT, while the level of financial development and political 
stability do not seem to matter. Empirical findings are confirmed by extensive robustness 
tests.  
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institutions, emerging countries.  
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, inflation targeting (hereafter IT) is becoming the monetary policy 
framework of choice in a growing number of emerging countries. Thus, by the end of 2009, 
there were nineteen emerging economies which have adopted this monetary policy strategy, 
predominantly Latin American and Central and Eastern European countries. Moreover, 
besides these countries, several other emerging countries have expressed the wish to move to 
IT at short-medium term
3
. 
According to Amato and Gerlach (2002), this evolution of monetary policy constitutes the 
most important change in the framework of monetary policy since the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system in 1971. The high popularity of IT in emerging countries can nevertheless be 
explained by the relative benefits of this monetary policy framework on economic 
performances observed in countries that have adopted IT, and corroborated by a significant 
body of empirical literature. For instance, using a propensity score matching methodology for 
a large sample of developing and emerging economies, Lin and Ye (2009) find that the level 
and variability of inflation are in average lower for inflation targeters than for non-targeters. 
Furthermore, we think that the choice of IT is a pragmatic response to difficulties of central 
banks in conducting their monetary policy using an exchange rate peg or a monetary 
aggregate as an intermediate target. 
Although the concept of IT is not clearly defined in the literature (Kohn, 2005; Schmitt-
Grohé, 2005), many authors have proposed formal characteristics that may distinguish IT 
from alternative monetary policy frameworks. Indeed, from the pioneer works of Bernanke et 
al. (1999) and Mishkin (2000), the criteria that characterize IT are: (i) a public announcement 
of a medium-term numerical inflation target; (ii) an institutional commitment to price stability 
as the primary monetary policy objective; (iii) the use of an information-inclusive strategy to 
set monetary policy instruments; (iv) and the adoption of high levels of transparency and 
accountability for the conduct of monetary policy. According to Bernanke et al. (1999), IT 
offers a framework of “constrained discretion” where the official target imposes the 
constraint, and the discretion is the scope for monetary authorities to take into account short-
                                                          
3
 These countries are: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Georgia, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Mauritius, Mongolia, Russia, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Venezuela (Pétursson, 2004). 
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term disturbances to output or financial stability. This flexibility in the conduct of monetary 
policy is particularly important for emerging economies that are often adversely affected by 
external shocks (Fraga et al., 2003). 
These considerations suggest therefore that the successful implementation of IT requires the 
fulfillment of several preconditions. The literature has identified some economic and 
institutional prerequisites that countries should satisfy if IT regime is to operate successfully
4
. 
These requirements include in particular an independent, transparent and accountable central 
bank with a clear price stability mandate, a sound fiscal policy, a well-developed financial 
market, a flexible exchange rate regime, relatively low inflation rates, and well-developed 
statistic and econometric models to understand monetary policy transmission mechanisms and 
to forecast inflation. The experience of emerging countries shows nonetheless that the non 
fulfillment of all of these requirements is not in itself an impediment to the adoption and 
success of IT. This emphasizes the fact that implementing IT is a gradual process with 
economic and institutional reforms before and after the official adoption of this monetary 
policy regime.  
Ultimately, and following Carare et al. (2002) and Gonçalves and Carvalho (2008), we think 
that the country’s decision to adopt IT is not random, but is the result of a weighing of the 
costs and benefits of this monetary policy framework against alternatives. This is especially 
true in emerging market economies, where reforms imposed by the adoption of IT can 
generate important economic and political costs, while the benefits on economic 
performances are uncertain. Paradoxically, while the question of preconditions for adopting 
IT is predominant in the literature, the number of empirical studies devoted to the 
determinants driving the choice of IT is relatively small. To the best of your knowledge, ten 
papers have empirically attempted to identify the factors associated with the choice of 
implementing this monetary policy strategy
5
. However, none of these papers have addressed 
this issue for emerging countries only, while reasons which have driven this category of 
countries to choose IT may differ from industrial countries. Moreover, these papers have 
focused on a relatively small set of explanatory variables potentially linked with a country’s 
decision to switch to IT, particularly concerning institutional and political factors. Finally, 
                                                          
4
 These preconditions have been especially underlined in the literature on IT in emerging market economies, 
such as Masson et al. (1997), Mishkin (2000), Amato and Gerlach (2002), and Carare et al. (2002). 
5
 These ten studies are provided by Gerlach (1999), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001), Truman (2003), Carare 
and Stone (2006), Hu (2006), Baltensperger et al. (2007), Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), Gonçalves and 
Carvalho (2008), Levya (2008), and Mukherjee and Singer (2008). See notably Pétursson (2004) for a detailed 
discussion of empirical results found by pre-2004 studies. 
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using different estimation methodologies, time coverage and country samples, these articles 
provide mixed results and therefore, come to different conclusions concerning the significant 
factors associated with the choice of IT. 
Accordingly, the aim of this paper is to contribute to the existing empirical literature in two 
ways. First, we focus our analysis on emerging economies by considering a large sample of 
targeters and non-targeters countries over the period of 1980-2006. Second, we extend the 
number of explanatory variables considered by previous studies by examining a large set of 
institutional and political factors potentially associated with a country’s choice of IT. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Before turning to the empirical analysis, we turn 
to the theoretical framework that guides our work and formulate some propositions linking 
domestic institutions and the choice of adopting IT in section 2. Section 3 presents the data 
and gives some preliminary statistical findings. Section 4 describes the econometric 
methodology used to identify institutional determinants of IT adoption in emerging 
economies, discusses our empirical results, and reports several robustness checks. The last 
section concludes. 
2. Domestic institutions and the choice of IT: a theoretical framework 
A recent body of literature on the political economy of monetary institutions addresses the 
question of the interaction between institutions and the choice of monetary policy regime. 
This literature develops various theoretical arguments implying that institutional framework 
might be an important determinant of monetary institutions, especially concerning the choice 
of exchange-rate regime or the choice to delegate monetary policy to an independent central 
bank. On the basis of this literature and the literature on IT, we formulate some propositions 
for explaining how institutional arrangements may be associated with a country’s choice of 
adopting an inflation target as a nominal anchor for monetary policy. The links between 
institutional setting and the choice of an IT strategy are analyzed by considering two 
categories of domestic institutions: monetary and financial institutions, and political 
institutions.  
2.1. Monetary and financial institutions 
As noted above, the literature on IT in emerging market economies suggests that this 
monetary policy strategy should be adopted only if some institutional preconditions are met. 
One of them is Central bank independence (CBI). Indeed, independence able to insulate the 
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central bank from political pressures to finance fiscal deficits and produce over-expansionary 
monetary policies that would lead to inflation above target. However, in some emerging 
countries, we observed that governments have passed legislation giving greater independence 
to their central bank only after the adoption of IT. In addition, according to Gerlach (1999), by 
“tying the government’s hands” with an official inflation target, IT can be viewed as a 
substitute for CBI. Despite the absence of a conclusive empirical answer to the question 
whether independent central banks are more likely to adopt IT or not, we think nonetheless 
that a sufficient degree of independence (especially instrument independence) is necessary 
before adopting IT to ensure the success and long-term sustainability of this monetary policy 
strategy.  
Proposition 1: The more independent the central bank, the higher the probability of a country 
adopting IT.  
Another important prerequisite for successful IT stressed by the literature is a healthy 
financial and banking system. Several reasons can be advanced to explain the great 
importance of well-functioning financial system (both financial markets and intermediaries) 
under an IT regime. First, and it is true for any other monetary policy strategy, a sound 
financial system is essential to guarantee an efficient transmission of monetary policy through 
the interest rate channel, but also through the credit channel. Second, according to Mishkin 
(2004), a weak banking sector is potentially problematic to achieve inflation target, because 
the central bank would be hesitant to raise short-term interest rates for fear that this will 
impact the profitability of banks and lead to a collapse of the financial system. Third, 
countries characterized by weak financial institutions are more vulnerable to a sudden stop of 
capital outflows, causing a sharp depreciation of the exchange rate which leads to upward 
pressures on the inflation rate (Mishkin, 2004). Fourth, a consequence of lack of large 
domestic capital markets is an important accumulation of foreign currency external liabilities 
by firms, households and the government, while their assets are denominated in domestic 
currency. This liability dollarization makes the financial system more vulnerable to a 
depreciation of the domestic currency
6
 by reducing the net worth of borrowers through a 
balance sheets effect. As described in Mishkin (1996), by increasing adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems, this deterioration of balance sheets can ultimately lead to a complete 
collapse of the banking system. The rescue of the banking system would dramatically increase 
                                                          
6
 As noted earlier, IT regime requires a single nominal anchor, and so theoretically exchange rate flexibility. 
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public debt and the risk of fiscal dominance (Burnside et al., 2001). Finally, as outlined in 
Woo (2003), a well-developed domestic capital market enables the public treasury to diversify 
its sources of funds (e.g. by issuing bonds), and then reduces incentive to finance public 
deficits through inflation. Given these arguments, it seems essential for a country to have 
strong financial institutions before adopting IT. Moreover, Cukierman (1992) argues that the 
degree of financial depth is positively correlated with the level of CBI, in the sense that broad 
financial markets are more likely to grant their central bank more independence in order to 
avoid potential disruptions in the process of financial intermediation. Posen (1993, 1995) 
explores this intuition by developing the concept of “financial opposition to inflation” and 
argues that CBI may be determined by the relative political influence of the financial sector
7
. 
We thus expect that countries with relatively developed financial sectors have a stronger 
financial opposition to inflation than countries characterized by weak financial systems, and 
therefore, are more likely to adopt IT.   
Proposition 2: The more developed the financial institutions, the higher the probability of a 
country adopting IT. 
2.2. Political institutions  
Political economy literature argues that policy-makers’ incentives and characteristics of 
political system play an important role in the choice of a monetary policy regime. Following 
this literature, we formulate three propositions which aim to explain how political institutional 
setting should be related with the choice of adopting IT.  
The choice of delegating the monetary policy to an independent central bank has received 
significant attention in the literature
8
. Several theoretical and empirical contributions have 
focused in particular on the link between domestic political institutions and the degree of 
central bank autonomy. One of the earliest studies was conducted by Cukierman (1992), who 
investigated the influence of political instability on CBI. The author argues and presents 
supporting evidence that greater political instability leads to a more independent central bank. 
More precisely, he shows that the higher the party political instability, the more independent 
the central bank will be, whereas a high level of regime political instability is negatively 
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 Posen (1995) develops a measure of “effective financial opposition to inflation” based on four criteria: (i) the 
level of universal banking; (ii) the independence of the banking sector from central bank regulation; (iii) the 
degree of federalism; and, (iv) the degree of fractionalization of the political party system. Nonetheless, in many 
studies, the financial opposition to inflation is proxied with an indicator of “financial depth”, such as the liquid 
liabilities (M3) to GDP ratio.  
8
 See Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) for a detailed literature review on the determinants of CBI. 
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related with CBI
9
. This positive relationship between party political instability and CBI could 
be explained by the fact that when politicians in office anticipate that they have a great 
probability to lose upcoming elections, they have a stronger interest in delegating authority to 
central bank in order to “tie the hands” of the future government, i.e. restrict the range of 
policy actions available (Eijffinger and De Haan, 1996). Multiple empirical studies have tried 
to test this positive relationship between party political instability and CBI but results are 
ambiguous. For example, while Bagheri and Habibi (1998) confirm this relationship for a 
sample of western democracies and highly democratic developing countries, Farvaque (2001) 
shows a contrario for a sample of twenty-one OECD countries that more-stability oriented 
societies give more independence to their central bank. Gonçalves and Carvalho (2008) test 
the impact of political instability on the likelihood of adopting IT but find an insignificant 
negative relationship
10
.  
Following Farvaque (2001), we expect that political stability (instability) affects positively 
(negatively) the probability of a country implementing an IT strategy. Indeed, we think that to 
be credible, and so efficient, this monetary policy framework requires a commitment of both 
government and central bank to long-term price-stability, and therefore a relative political 
stability. 
Proposition 3: The greater the political stability, the higher the probability of a country 
adopting IT. 
A second body of political economy literature focuses attention on diverging interests 
between decision-makers. More particularly, some papers have studied how the presence of 
checks and balances (i.e. multiple veto players) enhances the effects of delegation to an 
independent agency. Following Tsebelis (2002), we define veto players as the individual and 
collective actors (individual politicians, political parties, institutions, organizations) who have 
the power to block a proposed change in current policies. In other words, veto players refer to 
decision makers whose agreement is necessary before policies can be changed. In the context 
of monetary policy, Moser (1999) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) show theoretically that 
the delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank is more likely to enhance 
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 “Party political instability refers to the frequent change of government between competing political parties 
such as left wing and right wing, within a political regime”, while “regime political instability measures the 
frequency of irregular changes of political regime such as revolution, coup d’état, etc.” (Bagheri and Habibi, 
1998). 
10
 Gonçalves and Carvalho (2008) use the index of political instability compiled in the Political Handbook of the 
World which measures the frequency of changes in government since the 1970’s. 
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credibility (“time consistency”) in the presence of strong checks and balances. Indeed, in the 
presence of multiple veto players in a government, it becomes harder to reverse a decision to 
delegate, giving thus to the central bank greater scope to reduce the inflation bias. Moreover, 
theses authors show that this effect increases with the political polarization of veto players, 
i.e. with the polarization of inflation-output preferences. The empirical investigation 
conducted by Keefer and Stasavage (2002) for a sample of seventy-eight developed and 
developing countries over the period from 1975 to 1994 supports the argument that CBI is 
more effective as an anti-inflationary device in the presence of multi veto players in 
government
11
. Extending this argument, some contributions have attempted to assess whether 
the number of veto players in a government is associated with the choice of monetary policy 
regime. Moser (1999) classify OECD countries in three groups (countries with no, weak, and 
strong checks and balances) and shows that the legal CBI is significantly higher in countries 
whose legislative decision rules are characterized by strong checks and balances. Considering 
an index of partisan veto players, Hallerberg (2002) finds that the number of veto players is 
positively associated with the level of CBI in OECD countries.  
Following these theoretical and empirical findings, we hypothesize that the structure of 
political decision in general, and the number of institutional and partisan veto players in a 
political system in particular, are important in explaining the choice of IT. Indeed, there is 
some evidence that countries with a great number of veto players in the legislative and 
executive power may be unable to conduct myopic fiscal policies which increase the fiscal 
domination. Thus, we expect that the larger the number of veto players and the greater the 
separation of powers in a political system, the more credible the commitment to price stability 
and so, the higher the likelihood of implementing an inflation target approach. 
Proposition 4: The larger the number of institutional and partisan veto players, the higher the 
probability of a country adopting IT. 
Finally, in line with the previous proposition, we think that the probability of adopting IT 
should also be affected by the sub-national political structure. More precisely, we hypothesize 
that the likelihood of implementing an IT strategy is positively related to the degree of fiscal 
federalism. Some arguments have been developed in the literature to explain the direct or 
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 To test this proposition, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) include in their inflation equation an interaction term 
between CBI (legal index of CBI) and CHECK (index which measures the number of veto players present in a 
political system). They find a negative and significant relationship between this interaction term and the 
logarithm of inflation.  
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indirect positive relationship between the degree of federalism and the choice of politicians to 
implement institutional reforms which grant their central bank more independence. First, sub-
national entities can be viewed as additional veto players which have veto power over 
national policy decisions. For example, relying on the case of Germany, Lohmann (1998) 
notes that countries where provincial governments appoint a part of the central bank’s council 
are more likely to have councils with a significant proportion of members appointed by the 
current government’s political opponents. Second, Posen (1993) argues that countries 
characterized by a high degree of decentralization are expected to have a more effective 
financial opposition. The reason is that federalism increases proximity between actors and so, 
financial sector has a better access to decision-makers and can easier voice its inflation 
aversion. Thus, according to this author, independent central banks tend to be associated with 
federal systems. Finally, when constraints on fiscal policy execution emanating from a federal 
structure are too high, an authority could make the choice to give more independence to its 
central bank in order to harden its politicians’ budget constraints. Farvaque (2001) provides 
evidence that federalism is positively associated with CBI. Given these arguments, we expect 
a positive relationship between federalism and the probability of adopting IT.  
Proposition 5: The higher the degree of federalism and decentralization, the higher the 
probability of a country adopting IT.  
3. Data and descriptive findings 
To test our propositions, we examine a large set of institutional and political variables that 
could explain the likelihood that an emerging country pursues an IT strategy. Our panel 
dataset consists of thirty emerging countries, inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters, 
over the period of 1980-2006
12
. The data are drawn from various sources, including in 
particular the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 2008 and the Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI). 
3.1. Data
13
 
Dependent variable and sample countries. The endogenous variable is a binary variable 
taking the value 1 if a country operates with an IT framework at the year t, and 0 otherwise. In 
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 The data are not available for all countries on the whole period, so we use an unbalanced panel data. The list of 
countries that constitute our sample is given in Table 1. See appendix B for an overview of descriptive statistics 
and more details concerning missing observations.  
13
 See Appendix A for variables definitions and sources.  
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this paper, we adopt the classification of IT countries proposed by Levya (2008), which 
tabulates two IT adoption dates for each country having adopted this monetary policy 
framework by the end of 2005: one corresponding to a partial adoption (IT_PA) and the 
second to a fully-fledged adoption (IT_FF)
14
. According to this classification, our sample of 
inflation targeters is composed of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Guatemala, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, 
South Africa, South Korea, Thailand and Turkey
15
. Concerning the control group, i.e. the non-
IT countries, we consult the Standard & Poor’s Emerging Market Index, the Morgan Stanley 
Capital International Emerging Market Index, and the IMF’s International Capital Markets 
Department’s list of emerging markets. Following Joyce and Nabar (2009), we consider the 
countries which appear on at least two of these three lists. Table 1 lists the eighteen targeting 
and the twelve non targeting countries, and the years in which IT countries have adopted this 
monetary policy framework. 
As shown in Table 1, four countries (Chile, Israel, Mexico, and Peru) started using a partial IT 
framework before switching to a full-fledged IT. In fact, during this transition period, central 
banks of these countries have maintained an additional nominal anchor for monetary policy 
(typically an exchange rate band). Moreover, according to Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 
(2007), a partial IT is also characterized by the non-fulfillment of key preconditions for IT 
and the non-establishment of operational features of IT (such as publishing inflation reports 
that contain inflation projections). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Levya (2008) adopt the “half-year rule”: if IT is adopted in the second half of any year t, the year t+1 is 
considered as the adoption year. Note that we choose this classification because it is the most recent in the 
literature. Rose (2007) provides also a classification of IT countries through 2004 by considering two dates: 
default and conservative start dates. 
15
 Note that Turkey is included in our sample of inflation targeters since this country has adopted IT in January 
2006. 
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Table 1:  Country samples and dates of IT adoption 
Inflation targeting countries 
 
Partial adoption 
Fully-fledged 
adoption 
Brazil 1999 1999 
Chile 1991 2000 
Colombia 2000 2000 
Czech Republic 1998 1998 
Guatemala 2005 2005 
Hungary 2001 2001 
Indonesia 2005 2005 
Israel 1992 1997 
Mexico 1995 2001 
Peru 1994 2002 
Philippines 2002 2002 
Poland 1999 1999 
Romania 2005 2005 
Slovak Republic 2005 2005 
South Africa 2000 2000 
South Korea 1998 1998 
Thailand 2000 2000 
Turkey 2006 2006 
Non-inflation targeting countries  
Argentina Jordan Russia 
China Malaysia Sri Lanka 
Egypt  Morocco Venezuela 
India Pakistan Zimbabwe 
 
Independent variables. Contrary to previous papers that have assessed the role of CBI in the 
choice of IT using de jure measures of independence, we use in this paper a de facto index of 
CBI: the turnover rate of central bank governors. This indicator is an inverse proxy of CBI, 
i.e. a higher turnover rate indicates a lower level of independence. We use this index of CBI 
for two principal reasons. First, according to Cukierman (1992), the turnover rate of central 
bank governors is a better indicator of CBI than indicators based of central bank laws, 
especially for emerging and developing countries where the rule of law is less embedded in 
the political cultural than in industrialized countries. Second, information on the real term in 
office of central bank governors is easily available for a large set of countries. Using the new 
data set on central bank governors provided by Dreher et al. (2008) and information provided 
by central bank websites, we calculate the five-year (TOR_5) central bank governors turnover 
rate. We expect that the likelihood of adopting IT is higher in countries characterized by low 
level turnover rates, i.e. the sign of the coefficient of TOR_5 is expected to be negative. 
Following the empirical financial development literature, we use the ratio of private credit by 
deposit money banks and other financial institutions to GDP (PCRED) as proxy of financial 
12 
 
depth. This variable is taken from WDI. As discussed in the previous section, countries that 
have developed financial systems are expected to have a greater likelihood of switching to IT 
than countries with low financial depth. 
Concerning political institutions variables, we draw data from two major datasets devoted to 
political and institutional characteristics of countries, and largely used in the literature. These 
databases are the DPI compiled by Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003), and 
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) dataset. 
As noted in the previous section, political stability is expected to be positively related with the 
probability of adopting IT. To test this relationship, we consider the government stability 
index (GSTAB) computed by ICRG, which assesses the government’s ability to carry out its 
declared program(s) and its ability to stay in office, and taking values from 0 (very low 
stability) to 12 (very high stability). This variable is the sum of three subcomponents 
(government unity, legislative strength, and popular support), each with a maximum score of 
four points and a minimum score of zero point. We expect a positive relationship between this 
variable and the probability of adopting IT. 
To test our proposition 4, we use three complementary variables extracted from DPI. The two 
first variables assess the existence of partisan veto players (i.e. the ideological polarization in 
the legislature), while the third variable measures the number of institutional veto players. The 
first variable (POLARIZ) corresponds to the ideological distance, in a left-center-right scale, 
between the chief executive’s party and the four principal parties of the legislature. It is 
calculated by subtracting the chief executive’s party’s value and the values of the three largest 
government parties and the largest opposition party. Indeed, the distance between right (or 
left) and center is equal to one, while the distance between the right and the left is two
16
. The 
second (FRAC) measures the partisan fragmentation and is defined as the probability that two 
deputies picked at random from the legislature are of different parties. The third variable 
counts the number of veto players in a political system, accounting for party affiliations, 
electoral rules, and electoral competitiveness (CHECKS). Indeed, this variable provides a 
good approximation of the institutional rigidity of checks and balances. We also expect that 
these three variables are positively related with the likelihood of implementing IT regime. 
Finally, to test if the probability of a country adopting IT increases with the degree of 
federalism and decentralization, we consider a variable (FED) drawn from DPI which 
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 Note that POLARIZ is equal to zero if elections are not competitive or if the chief executive’s party has an 
absolute majority in all houses with lawmaking powers. See Keefer (2007) for most details. 
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measures whether state/province governments are directly locally elected. This variable takes 
the value zero if neither provincial executive nor provincial legislature is locally elected, the 
value one if the executive is appointed but the legislative elected, and the value two if 
executive and legislative are both locally elected. We think therefore that this index 
constitutes a good proxy for constraints on fiscal policy execution emanating from a federal 
structure of government
17
. 
Control variables. Besides these institutional and political variables, we consider a set of 
control variables to capture other factors considered in the literature as potentially relevant for 
understanding the choice of IT. These variables reflect the countries’ economic structure and 
the macroeconomic performances and consist of: the log of real GDP per capita, the lagged 
inflation rate, the exchange rate regime, and the trade openness. 
The log of real GDP per capita (LRGDP) is included as a control variable to capture the 
differences in the level of economic development between countries. Indeed, some empirical 
studies have shown that poorer countries tend to have less well-developed tax administrations, 
and so a lower capacity to levy and collect taxes (see, e.g., Chelliah, 1971). Under these 
conditions, governments rely more heavily on seigniorage revenue to finance budget deficits 
and have a lower incentive to adopt IT. Moreover, according to Walsh (2005), GDP per capita 
may serve as a proxy for structural rigidities. LRGDP is expected to have a positive effect on 
the probability of adopting IT regime. 
We also control for the lagged rate of inflation (CPI_1), measured by annual percentage 
change of consumer prices, and we expect this variable to be negatively associated with the 
likelihood of implementing IT strategy
18
. Indeed, according to the literature (e.g., Masson et 
al., 1997; Truman, 2003), a country should adopt IT only after a successful disinflation 
process. 
Finally, we consider as control variables the exchange rate flexibility (EXCH) and the trade 
openness (OPEN). As emphasized previously, exchange rate flexibility is theoretically 
required by IT in order to avoid potential conflict between the inflation target and the 
exchange rate target. We think therefore that countries with flexible exchange rate 
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 Note that DPI provides a better proxy than the variable FED, which measures whether state/province 
governments have authority over taxing, spending or legislating, but this index is only available for a limited 
number of countries. 
18
 Inflation rate is lagged one period to avoid a potential simultaneity/endogeneity bias between inflation 
targeting adoption and inflation level.  
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arrangements are relatively more resilient to exchange rate fluctuations, and so, more likely to 
adopt IT (IMF, 2006). To measure the degree of exchange rate flexibility, we use the annual 
“fine” classification developed by Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) that divides de facto exchange 
rate regimes into fourteen categories (category 1 corresponding to the less flexible and 14 to 
the less rigid). Trade openness, measured as the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP, is 
introduced as a proxy for exposure degree to external shocks. Following Pétursson (2004), we 
expect that the probability of adopting an inflation target increases with trade openness, 
because of the difficulty of maintaining a fixed exchange rate in an economy highly 
vulnerable to external shocks. In addition, as noted in introduction, IT framework provides 
sufficient flexibility to deal with the short-term consequences of shocks. Moreover, according 
to Romer (1993) and Lane (1997), the larger the degree of openness, the weaker the 
incentives for policymakers to generate an inflationary bias and so, the greater the CBI. 
Hence, we expect EXCH and OPEN to be positively related with the probability of adopting 
IT. 
3.2. Descriptive findings 
Before turning to the econometric analysis, we present some descriptive statistics for the 
explanatory variables we use in the regressions. This statistical analysis may be helpful in 
suggesting a preliminary answer to the question whether factors presented in the previous 
section are associated with the choice of IT in emerging economies. Our statistical analysis 
proceeds in two steps. First, we calculate the correlations among the variables discussed 
above to identify the explanatory variables strongly correlated with IT, and to detect potential 
multicollinearity between the independent variables. Second, we divide our sample of 
countries into two groups, inflation targeters and non-inflation targeters, and we test whether 
the mean value of each explanatory variable is the same for the two monetary regimes (IT and 
non-IT) before the adoption of IT. 
Correlations. Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between the variables. First, we can 
see that none of the explanatory variables are highly and significantly correlated with IT 
dummy. Nonetheless, it is important to note that all significant correlation coefficients 
between institutional variables and IT dummy (IT_PA and IT_FF) exhibit the expected sign. 
Second, we do not suspect a potential multicollinearity problem because none of the 
independent variables are highly and significantly correlated among themselves. 
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Table 2: Correlation coefficients 
  IT_PA IT_FF CPI_1 LRGDP EXCH OPEN TOR_5 PCRED GSTAB POLARIZ FRAC  CHECKS FED 
IT_PA 1.00 
            IT_FF 0.88*** 1.00 
           CPI_1 -0.01 -0.01 1.00 
          LRGDP 0.09*** 0.08*** -0.05*** 1.00 
         EXCH 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.10*** -0.01 1.00 
        OPEN -0.03** -0.01 -0.04** 0.27*** -0.32*** 1.00 
       TOR_5 -0.03** -0.04** 0.07*** -0.04*** 0.23*** -0.13*** 1.00 
      PCRED -0.01 -0.01 -0.06*** 0.67*** -0.06*** 0.19*** -0.09*** 1.00 
     GSTAB 0.06*** 0.05*** -0.09*** 0.28*** -0.19*** 0.23*** -0.29*** 0.23*** 1.00 
    POLARIZ 0.15*** 0.13*** 0.02 0.44*** 0.04** 0.01 0.03* 0.31*** 0.14*** 1.00 
   FRAC  0.14*** 0.12*** 0.04** 0.32*** 0.00 0.08*** 0.03** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.47*** 1.00 
  CHECKS 0.14*** 0.13*** -0.01 0.39*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.00 0.29*** 0.13*** 0.61*** 0.53*** 1.00 
 FED  0.03* 0.05***  -0.03  0.29***  0.14***  -0.09**  -0.03*  0.32***  0.03  0.25***  0.12***  0.33***  1.00  
Note: *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Means value comparisons. Table 3 presents the means comparison tests for the different 
explanatory variables. For the targeters, averages are calculated using the five year period 
prior to the adoption of IT (IT_PA and IT_FF). Concerning the non-targeters, we follow Ball 
and Sheridan (2003) suggestion and consider as the “year of adoption” the mean of the 
adoption dates in the targeters group. This date is so the same for all non-targeting countries, 
respectively 2000 if we consider partial adoption dates and 2001 in the case of fully-fledged 
adoption. First, and interestingly, non-inflation targeters exhibit on average a lower turnover 
rate of central bank governors than IT countries. This result, opposite to our proposition 1, 
seems to indicate that the precondition of CBI has not been fulfilled by emerging economies, 
and in a way, corroborates the substitutability argument developed by Gerlach (1999). 
Concerning financial depth, results suggest that non-IT countries have more developed 
financial markets than inflation targeters, but the mean difference is not statistically 
significant. Concerning political institutions variables, non-inflation targeters exhibit on 
average higher government stability than IT countries. This statistical result is contrary to our 
proposition 3. Conversely, except for CHECKS, statistical findings seem to support our 
proposition 4 linking political system’s decision-making process and the probability of a 
country adopting IT, since the number of institutional and partisan veto players is largest in IT 
countries. Our proposition 5 linking the degree of federalism and the choice of adopting IT is 
not confirmed by the data. Finally, concerning control variables, we find that on average, IT 
countries have higher level of economic development and higher exchange rate flexibility 
than non inflation targeters, while mean differences of inflation rate and trade openness are 
not statistically significant at conventional critical values. 
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Although these latter results give a first interesting indication on the key role played by 
institutions in the choice of implementing or not an IT framework for monetary policy, they 
need to be interpreted with caution because this kind of analysis requires choosing a base year 
for non-IT countries, this choice obviously influencing statistical findings. 
 
Table 3: Means comparison tests 
  Partial adoption Fully-fledged adoption 
 
Targeters 
Non-
targeters 
Pr (|T|>|t|) Targeters 
Non-
targeters 
Pr (|T|>|t|) 
Monetary and financial institutions 
      
TOR_5 0.26 0.13 0.00 0.22 0.16 0.03 
PRCRED 47.19 51.51 0.57 48.70 52.63 0.61 
Political institutions 
      
GSTAB 7.60 8.73 0.00 8.29 9.42 0.00 
POLARIZ 0.70 0.29 0.00 0.77 0.32 0.00 
FRAC 0.69 0.56 0.00 0.70 0.66 0.00 
CHECKS 3.61 3.86 0.60 3.81 3.78 0.95 
FED 1 1.02 0.89 1 1 1.00 
Control variables 
      
CPI 164.81 17.37 0.12 35.88 13.29 0.34 
LRGDP 8.01 7.24 0.00 8.05 7.26 0.00 
OPEN 69.09 66.90 0.76 70.05 67.27 0.71 
EXCH 9.46 6.71 0.00 9.54 6.24 0.00 
 
 
4. Econometric evidence 
The main objective of our empirical analysis is to identify the main institutional and political 
determinants driving the choice of IT in emerging countries. Thus, after presenting 
econometric methodology used, we discuss our results. Finally, we perform several sensitivity 
analyses that check the robustness of our empirical results.  
 
4.1. Econometric methodology 
We begin by investigating whether the institutional variables described in the previous section 
are related to the choice of adopting IT in emerging economies. Given the nature of the 
dependent variable, the binary decision to adopt (or not adopt) an IT regime is modeled with a 
probit model
19
. Moreover, given the nature of our country sample and since the institutional 
variables considered are often time-invariant or characterized by a little within variance, we 
                                                          
19
 More precisely, using panel data, we model the choice of adopting and having in place an IT regime, since 
none of emerging countries having implemented this monetary policy framework has renounced it to date. 
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use a random-effects probit model. The general structure of the model we estimate is as 
follows: 
    
              
                                                                                                           
where     
  is an unobserved latent variable which describes the choice of adopting IT, while 
the subscripts i and t denote country and year, respectively.   refers to the constant term, 
       is the vector of institutional determinants of the IT regime choice, and     is the vector 
of control variables. Unobserved country heterogeneity is captured by   ,  
  and    are the 
vector of coefficient estimates, and     is the error term. The error term is assumed to be 
normally, independently and identically distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of   .  
Although     
  is unobservable, we do observe the choice of implementing IT for country i at 
year t. The observed binary variable characterizing the country’s decision to adopt IT is 
related to the latent variable     
  such that: 
    
         
    
         
     
                                                                                                                                   
taking the value of 1 if a country has in place an IT regime at the year t and 0 otherwise.  
Before discussing empirical findings, it is relevant to note that our results need to be 
interpreted with caution for two reasons. First, the random effects model assumes    
uncorrelated with right-hand-side variables. But, according to Mundlak (1978), the probability 
of no correlation between individual-specific effects and some explanatory variables is low. 
Second, it is possible to suspect the existence of a potential endogeneity bias since the 
implementation of IT is a gradual process with economic and institutional reforms before and 
after the official adoption of this monetary policy framework (see, e.g., Batini and Laxton, 
2006) and, as shown by some empirical studies, the adoption of IT in emerging economies has 
improved economic performances. 
 
4.2. Results 
The estimation results of the probit model are shown in table 4. In order to identify and 
quantify the impact of domestic institutions described above on the probability of adopting IT, 
estimations are performed separately for each institutional variable on the same set of control 
variables. Also, from an econometric point of view, this approach allows to avoid a potential 
collinearity problem between institutional variables, especially between variables taken from 
DPI. Moreover, as emphasized previously, for each specification we consider two dates of IT 
adoption: partial adoption (IT_PA) and fully-fledged adoption (IT_FF). Nonetheless, overall, 
we can see that there are few differences between results provided by IT_PA and IT_FF, 
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which lead to very similar coefficients and statistical significance levels. This can be 
explained by the fact that only four countries of our sample of inflation targeters started using 
a partial IT framework. Concerning the explanatory power of our probit model, it is relatively 
high with a pseudo-R
2 
comprised between 0.55 and 0.63 in the case of partial adoption, and 
between 0.61 and 0.65 in the case of fully-fledged adoption. 
The first two columns report the results for monetary and financial institutions, while columns 
(3) to (7) report the results for political institutions. As can be seen in column (1), the turnover 
rate of central bank governors is significantly and negatively associated with the probability 
of IT adoption. This result, opposite to Gerlach (1999), confirms our proposition 1 and shows 
that CBI is an important pre-condition for successful IT. 
Concerning financial depth (column 2), we find a negative but insignificant relationship 
between the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to 
GDP and the likelihood of adopting IT. This result seems to indicate that emerging countries 
have made the choice to implement an IT strategy in the presence of weak financial markets. 
This choice could nonetheless be explained by the fact that these countries have maintained 
an implicit exchange rate target after the adoption of IT to avoid a potential collapse of the 
financial sector, as described in section 2 (see, e.g., Edwards, 2006; Aizenman et al., 2008; 
and, Kisinbay et al., 2009). 
Turning to the political factors, the evidence from the probit model corroborates partially 
theoretical arguments developed in section 2. First, results reported in column (3) of table 4 
show that government stability is not related with IT adoption in emerging economies, since 
the estimated coefficient of GSTAB is not statistically significant. This result, contrary to our 
proposition 3, is nonetheless consistent with empirical findings of Gonçalves and Carvalho 
(2008) and could be explained by the proxy of political stability used. 
Second, results regarding the link between the number of institutional and partisan veto 
players and the probability of adopting IT are conform to our expectations. Indeed, as shown 
in columns (4), (5) and (6), there exists a positive and significant relationship between 
POLARIZ, FRAC, and CHECKS, and the likelihood of adopting IT. These results are 
consistent with those found by Moser (1999) and Hallerberg (2002), and with our statistical 
findings. Hence, the probability of switching to IT in emerging countries increases with the 
number of institutional and partisan veto players, measured here by three complementary 
variables.  
Third, concerning the link between the degree of federalism and decentralization and the 
probability of adopting IT, we find more ambiguous results. Indeed, results reported in the last 
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column show a positive relationship between FED and IT_PA but only statistically significant 
at the 10% level, while we find a positive but insignificant relationship FED and IT_FF. 
Finally, concerning control variables, all coefficients have the expected sign and are overall 
statistically significant. Thus, results indicate that the log of real GDP per capita, the exchange 
rate flexibility, and the trade openness are positively associated with a greater likelihood of 
adopting IT, while the lagged inflation rate is negatively related to this probability. These 
latter results are similar to those found by recent empirical studies, such as Hu (2006), 
Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), and Levya (2008). 
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Table 4: Monetary, financial and political institutions and the choice of adopting IT, probit regression results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF 
TOR_5 
-3.791*** 
(1.38) 
-4.48** 
(1.76)       
      
PCRED 
  
-0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.012 
(0.01)     
      
GSTAB 
    
0.088 
(0.09) 
-0.062 
(0.09)   
      
POLARIZ 
      
1.259*** 
(0.41) 
0.819** 
(0.36) 
      
FRAC 
        
4.973*** 
(1.81) 
5.478*** 
(1.92) 
    
CHECKS 
        
  0.756*** 
(0.21) 
0.455*** 
(0.15) 
  
FED 
        
    1.587* 
(0.91) 
0.779 
(0.94) 
CPI_1 
-0.136*** 
(0.29) 
-0.371*** 
(0.07) 
-0.141*** 
(0.02) 
-0.348*** 
(0.06) 
-0.134*** 
(0.03) 
-0.353*** 
(0.06) 
-0.139*** 
(0.03) 
-0.379*** 
(0.07) 
-0.149*** 
(0.03) 
-0.402*** 
(0.07) 
-0.167*** 
(0.03) 
-0.346*** 
(0.06) 
-0.128*** 
(0.03) 
-0.326*** 
(0.06) 
LRGDP 
5.841*** 
(1.82) 
10.623*** 
(0.86) 
6.759*** 
(1.47) 
8.095*** 
(0.92) 
5.844*** 
(0.51) 
4.904*** 
(1.56) 
4.957*** 
(1.46) 
6.613*** 
(1.88) 
6.044*** 
(1.31) 
7.186*** 
(0.91) 
10.244*** 
(0.91) 
6.094*** 
(1.67) 
10.339*** 
(0.69) 
9.889*** 
(0.72) 
EXCH 
0.291*** 
(0.08) 
0.382*** 
(0.13) 
0.258*** 
(0.07) 
0.309*** 
(0.09) 
0.331*** 
(0.08) 
0.292*** 
(0.08) 
0.285*** 
(0.07) 
0.321*** 
(0.09) 
0.313*** 
(0.08) 
0.416*** 
(0.11) 
0.427*** 
(0.09) 
0.342*** 
(0.09) 
0.306*** 
(0.09) 
0.298*** 
(0.09) 
OPEN 
0.033*** 
(0.01) 
0.032* 
(0.01) 
0.041*** 
(0.01) 
0.034** 
(0.01) 
0.043*** 
(0.01) 
0.037*** 
(0.01) 
0.041** 
(0.02) 
0.037*** 
(0.01) 
0.047*** 
(0.01) 
0.029 
(0.02) 
0.061*** 
(0.01) 
0.031** 
(0.01) 
0.054*** 
(0.01) 
0.038** 
(0.01) 
Constant 
-52.32*** 
(14.56) 
-91.07*** 
(7.79) 
-50.70*** 
(12.52) 
-69.71*** 
(8.27) 
-54.94*** 
(5.05) 
-44.23*** 
(12.85) 
-47.91*** 
(12.51) 
-60.36*** 
(16.30) 
-59.40*** 
(11.61) 
-67.11*** 
(8.57) 
-95.53*** 
(8.41) 
-56.19*** 
(14.39) 
-93.46*** 
(5.86) 
-87.06*** 
(6.43) 
Nb. of observations 688 688 674 674 589 589 605 605 652 652 684 684 590 590 
Nb. of countries 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 27 27 
LR test 137.6*** 68.8*** 129.7*** 43.4*** 121.7*** 53.6*** 108.6*** 26.5*** 128.9*** 70.1*** 126.2*** 63.4*** 158.9*** 73.8*** 
Log likelihood -105.86 -92.01 -110.38 -96.09 -96.57 -85.37 -89.36 -77.77 -102.55 -90.16 -96.50 -93.21 -96.95 -89.42 
Pseudo-R2 0.60 0.65 0.58 0.63 0.55 0.61 0.60 0.65 0.59 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.59 0.62 
Note: Standard errors are reported between brackets. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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4.3. Robustness and sensitivity analysis 
We check the robustness of our empirical results in several ways. In order to economize 
space, in this sub-section, we present only the estimated coefficients of explanatory variables 
of interest. Results for control variables can be provided upon request. 
First, we want to check whether results are robust to changes in the sample of non-IT 
countries (i.e. the control group). Thus, we consider three different samples of non-IT 
economies with available data extracted from Gonçalves and Salles (2008), Batini and Laxton 
(2006), and Lin and Ye (2009). Due to data availability, these samples are composed of 
twenty, twenty-five, and twenty-three countries, respectively. Furthermore, we consider a 
fourth sample composed of countries which appear in these three samples. This intersected 
sample is composed of ten countries. Appendix C details these different country samples. 
Results for these four country samples are reported in rows (1) to (4) of table 5. They are 
consistent with those found in the previous sub-section. 
Second, we check the robustness of our results to the inclusion of additional control variables 
in the initial probit model. More precisely, we introduce separately in Eq. (1) two other 
variables that could explain the adoption of IT by emerging countries. These variables are the 
central government debt-to-GDP ratio (DEBT) provided by Jaimovich and Panizza (2010), 
and the number of countries (industrialized and emerging) that have adopted IT at the year t 
(NUM_IT)
20
. The stock of public debt is included to account for countries’ fiscal soundness, 
frequently noted as a precondition for the adoption of IT. Indeed, large public debt levels raise 
the risk of fiscal dominance, i.e. the risk that in the long run the central bank need to monetize 
the public debt (see, e.g., Amato and Gerlach, 2002). Following Truman (2003), Hu (2006), 
and Calderón and Schmidt-Hebbel (2008), we therefore expect a negative relationship 
between the public debt-to-GDP ratio and the probability of adopting IT. Concerning the 
second additional control variable, it is introduced to account for a potential “popularity 
effect” of IT. Indeed, although they do not satisfy most of the preconditions theoretically 
required for adopting IT, a growing number of emerging countries has adopted this monetary 
policy framework over the last decade and, as emphasized in introduction, many other have 
expressed an interest in moving to IT at short-medium term. This increasing popularity of IT 
among emerging economies can nonetheless be explained by the relative good 
                                                          
20
 Note that data on public debt are not available for Romania. 
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macroeconomic performance of inflation targeters, and by “promotion” efforts made by the 
IMF to support and encourage emerging countries to adopt IT (Epstein, 2006). Hence, we 
expect this variable to be positively related with the likelihood of adopting IT. The estimation 
results included as additional control variables the stock of public debt ant the number of IT 
countries around the world are shown in rows (5) and (6) of table 5, respectively. The 
inclusion of these variables in the model does not change our results significantly. Concerning 
the estimated coefficients of additional control variables, they have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant at conventional critical values in all regressions. 
Third, we check whether our results are robust to different sample periods. We then re-
estimate the initial probit model by dropping the pre-1990 observations.  Row (7) of table 5 
reports the results from this probit regression. Our results do not change for the new sample 
period. 
Fourth, since some countries of our sample have experienced hyperinflation, it is possible that 
outliers associated with high-inflation episodes affect the results of our regressions. This 
possibility is accounted in row (8) of table 5 by dropping all hyperinflation periods (defined as 
an annual inflation rate ≥ 40%). Results are very similar to those reported in table 4. 
Interestingly, the estimated coefficient of lagged inflation rate is still negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Table 5: Domestic institutions and the choice of adopting IT, robustness checks 
Equation TOR_5 PCRED GSTAB POLARIZ FRAC CHECKS FED 
 
Partial adoption 
(1) GS sample 
-3.91*** 
(1.41) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
1.28*** 
(0.34) 
5.36*** 
(1.80) 
0.64*** 
(0.16) 
2.28*** 
(0.66) 
(2) BL sample 
-3.62*** 
(1.30) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
1.25*** 
(0.42) 
5.74*** 
(1.78) 
0.75*** 
(0.21) 
2.19*** 
(0.76) 
(3) LY sample 
-3.66*** 
(1.21) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.11 
(0.08) 
1.21*** 
(0.32) 
4.89*** 
(1.50) 
0.63*** 
(0.16) 
1.23* 
(0.64) 
(4) Both samples 
-3.79*** 
(1.32) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
1.19*** 
(0.39) 
5.89*** 
(2.05) 
0.78*** 
(0.22) 
2.46** 
(1.02) 
(5) Adding public debt  
-6.08*** 
(2.23) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
1.16*** 
(0.35) 
4.95*** 
(1.89) 
0.58*** 
(0.22) 
1.82* 
(1.01) 
(6) Adding “popularity 
effect” 
-4.38* 
(2.58) 
-0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.05 
(0.18) 
2.21*** 
(0.84) 
6.46* 
(3.81) 
0.65** 
(0.31) 
-1.99 
(1.20) 
(7) Post-1990 sample 
-4.54** 
(1.87) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.05 
(0.10) 
1.30** 
(0.53) 
4.76** 
(2.01) 
0.64*** 
(0.22) 
-2.28 
(1.37) 
(8) No hyperinflation periods 
-7.78*** 
(2.19) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.07 
(0.10) 
1.37*** 
(0.48) 
5.87*** 
(1.87) 
0.73*** 
(0.19) 
2.66** 
(1.29) 
 
Fully-fledged adoption 
(1) GS sample 
-3.33*** 
(1.20) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
0.83*** 
(0.30) 
5.87*** 
(1.55) 
0.49*** 
(0.16) 
1.07* 
(0.56) 
(2) BL sample 
-4.24*** 
(1.64) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
0.84** 
(0.39) 
6.93*** 
(2.39) 
0.47*** 
(0.17) 
1.16 
(0.95) 
(3) LY sample 
-3.29*** 
(1.24) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.09) 
0.80*** 
(0.29) 
5.52*** 
(1.46) 
0.49*** 
(0.14) 
1.47* 
(0.77) 
(4) Both samples 
-3.53*** 
(1.36) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
0.70** 
(0.34) 
5.50*** 
(2.00) 
0.48*** 
(0.15) 
0.92 
(0.93) 
(5) Adding public debt  
-4.62*** 
(1.58) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
0.94*** 
(0.32) 
4.71** 
(2.25) 
0.26* 
(0.14) 
0.36 
(0.60) 
(6) Adding “popularity 
effect” 
-3.91 
(2.95) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.18 
(0.18) 
2.28** 
(0.96) 
5.57* 
(3.26) 
0.20 
(0.17) 
-0.23 
(0.74) 
(7) Post-1990 sample 
-3.78*** 
(1.32) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
0.68** 
(0.29) 
3.76** 
(1.60) 
0.27** 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.58) 
(8) No hyperinflation periods 
-4.48** 
(1.76) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.09) 
0.82** 
(0.36) 
5.47*** 
(1.92) 
0.45** 
(0.15) 
0.78 
(0.94) 
Note: Standard errors are reported between brackets. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
Fifth, we test whether our results are sensitive to the model used. We thus re-estimate Eq. (1) 
using an alternative non-linear probabilistic model (logit model) and a linear probability 
model (GLS estimator), and we compare results of these two specifications and with those 
obtained with probit model. Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients of explanatory 
variables of interest across these three models. We can see that the sign and the significance 
of estimated parameters obtained with the probit model (column 1) tend to be closer to those 
obtained with the logit (column 2) and the linear probability model (column 3). Note 
nonetheless that the coefficient of GSTAB becomes positive and significant with the random 
effects estimation method (GLS estimator), while it stays insignificant with the logit model. 
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Table 6: Comparison of binary models and estimated coefficients 
Variable 
Probit 
(1) 
Logit 
(2) 
GLS 
(3) 
 
IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF IT_PA IT_FF 
TOR_5 
-3.791*** 
(1.38) 
-4.48** 
(1.76) 
-7.53*** 
(2.60) 
-7.15** 
(2.82) 
-0.39*** 
(0.06) 
-0.34*** 
(0.06) 
PCRED 
-0.003 
(0.01) 
-0.012 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
GSTAB 
0.088 
(0.09) 
-0.062 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.17) 
-0.11 
(0.18) 
0.03*** 
(0.00) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
POLARIZ 
1.259*** 
(0.41) 
0.819** 
(0.36) 
2.33*** 
(0.75) 
1.43** 
(0.60) 
0.12*** 
(0.02) 
0.08*** 
(0.02) 
FRAC 
4.973*** 
(1.81) 
5.478*** 
(1.92) 
9.18*** 
(3.45) 
9.73*** 
(3.42) 
0.22*** 
(0.07) 
0.15** 
(0.07) 
CHECKS 
0.756*** 
(0.21) 
0.455*** 
(0.15) 
1.26*** 
(0.33) 
0.80*** 
(0.28) 
0.02*** 
(0.00) 
0.01** 
(0.00) 
FED 
1.587* 
(0.91) 
0.779 
(0.94) 
 3.21** 
(1.54) 
 1.42 
(1.86) 
0.04 
(0.03)  
 0.06* 
(0.03) 
Note: Standard errors are reported between brackets. *, **, *** refer to statistical significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. 
Finally, we try to check if the non-significance of some right-hand-side variables in most 
specifications is not due to measures used. Thus, we re-estimate Eq. (1) by exploring 
alternative measures of financial depth and political stability. For brevity sake, results of 
estimations using these alternative variables are not reported, but are available upon request. 
Concerning financial depth, we use three proxies taken from the database of financial 
development and structure of Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009): the ratio of deposit money 
banks assets to GDP (DMBA), liquid liabilities as a percentage of GDP (LLGDP), and the 
total amount of outstanding domestic debt securities issued by public domestic entities as a 
percentage of GDP (PUBOND)
21
. The two first variables are proxies of financial development 
commonly used in the literature, while we consider a proxy of government bond market 
liquidity in order to test the argument of Woo (2003) developed in section 2. As private 
credit-to-GDP ratio, we find that DMBA and LLGDP are not significantly related to the 
probability of adopting IT. Conversely, results show a positive and significant relationship 
between PUBOND and the likelihood of IT adoption. This latter result, consistent with those 
found by Woo (2003), means that countries with more developed government bond markets 
are more capable of financing public deficits without resorting to seigniorage, and therefore 
have a higher probability of adopting IT.   
                                                          
21
 Note that data on liquid liabilities and deposit money bank assets are not available for China and Zimbabwe. 
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Concerning political stability, the number of indexes available over a long period of time is 
relatively limited. Therefore, in order to test whether our results are not sensitive to the choice 
of the political stability measure, we consider two proxies. The first proxy we use is the 
government stability index (STABS) provided by DPI. This variable is calculated by dividing 
the number of exits of veto players between year t and year t+1 by the total number of veto 
players in year t. Veto players considered are the president and the largest party in the 
legislature for a presidential system, and the prime minister and the parties in the government 
coalition for a parliamentary system. This variable is therefore on a 0-1 scale, with zero 
representing no exits and one representing the exit and replacement of all veto players. We 
then consider the Polity2 index (POLITY2) developed by the Polity IV Project as an overall 
measure of political stability. This variable assesses whether a country is more democratic or 
authoritarian. This index takes values from -10 (very autocratic) to +10 (very democratic) and 
is constructed by subtracting the “democracy” score from the “autocracy” score22. Our results 
suggest nonetheless that they are somewhat sensitive to the choice of the political stability 
measure, since we find that the government stability index computed by DPI yields similar 
results than those obtained with GSTAB, while results exhibit a positive and significant 
relationship between Polity2 index and the probability of adopting IT in emerging economies. 
This latter result is confirmed if, following Yang (2008) and Ehrhart (2009), we normalize the 
Polity2 index to a range of [0; 1], with zero corresponding to a situation of “full autocracy” 
and one to a situation of “full democracy”. 
In summary, we find our empirical results highly robust to changes in the sample of non-IT 
countries, in the control variables, and in the sample period. We also find that our results do 
not change substantially if we consider a logit model and alternative measures for non-
significant variables.  
5. Conclusions 
The main purpose of this paper was to identify the major institutional and political factors 
driving the choice of adopting IT in emerging economies. After providing a comprehensive 
survey on the institutional and political factors potentially related to IT adoption, we 
empirically test our propositions using a panel probit model and perform many robustness 
tests to check the sensitivity of our results. 
                                                          
22
 See the dataset users’ manual available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2007.pdf for a detail 
description of this index. 
26 
 
Using a dataset covering thirty IT and non-IT emerging countries, from 1980-2006, our 
empirical results suggest three important findings. First, it appears that CBI, proxied by the 
turnover rate of central bank governors, is positively related with the choice of adopting IT. 
This result, opposite to Gerlach (1999), suggests therefore that central bank autonomy is an 
important precondition for the adoption and success of IT strategy. Second, results show that 
the financial development precondition, proxied by many indicators, is not satisfied in 
emerging countries having adopted IT. Nonetheless, this result is not surprising since most of 
IT emerging countries have maintained an implicit exchange rate target after the adoption of 
this monetary policy framework. Furthermore, in accordance with results found by Woo 
(2003), we find a positive and significant relationship between government bond market 
liquidity and the probability of adopting IT. 
Finally, empirical findings support that policymakers’ incentives and characteristics of 
political system matter in the choice of adopting IT in emerging market economies. Thus, we 
find that the presence of checks and balances in the political system increases the probability 
that a country adopts IT. This result is highly robust to measures used for capturing the 
presence of checks and balances, since we find a positive and significant effect between the 
number of institutional veto players and the likelihood of adopting IT, but this relationship is 
also confirmed when we use a variable capturing the existence of partisan veto players. 
Concerning the link between the degree of federalism and the probability of adopting IT, we 
find a positive and significant relationship. However, results are sensitive to the IT adoption 
date considered. Finally, we do not find a significantly relationship between the degree of 
political stability and the likelihood of adopting IT in emerging economies.  
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Appendix A. Variables definitions and sources 
Variables Definition and source 
CHECKS 
Number of veto players in a political system, accounting for party affiliations, electoral rules, and electoral 
competitiveness. Source: Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) [april 2008 update]. Database 
available on the website of the World Bank at: http://www.wordlbank.org  
CPI_1 
One-year lagged inflation rate, measured by annual percentage change of consumer prices. Source: World 
Development Indicators (2008). 
DEBT 
Central government debt as a percentage of GDP. Source: Jaimovich and Panizza (2010). Data available at: 
http://www.iadb.org/research/pub_desc.cfm?pub_id=DBA-005  
DMBA 
Deposit money banks assets to GDP. Source: Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). Database available on the 
website of the World Bank at: http://www.wordlbank.org 
EXCH 
De facto “fine” classification of exchange rate regimes: polytomic variable taking values from 1 (hard pegs) to 
14 (freely falling). Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004; 2009 update). Database available on the homepage of 
Carmen M. Reinhart at: http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~creinhar/Papers.html  
FED 
Variable taking the value zero if neither provincial executive nor provincial legislature is locally elected, the 
value 1 if the executive is appointed but the legislative elected, and the value 2 if executive and legislative are 
both locally elected. Source: Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) [april 2008 update]. 
FRAC 
Probability that to deputies picked at random from the legislature will be of different parties. Source: Beck et 
al. (2001) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) [april 2008 update]. 
GSTAB 
Government stability: variable assessing the government’s ability to carry out its declared program(s) and its 
ability to stay in office, and taking values from 0 (very low stability) to 12 (very high stability). This variable is 
the sum of three subcomponents (government unity, legislative strength, and popular support), each with a 
maximum score of four points and a minimum score of zero point. Source: International Country Risk Guide. 
IT 
Binary variable taking the value 1 if a country has in place an IT regime at the period  , and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Levya (2008) 
LLGDP 
Liquid liabilities as percentage of GDP. Liquid liabilities include currency, demand and interest-bearing 
liabilities of banks and other financial institutions. Source: Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). 
LRGDP Log of real GDP per capita in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Source: World Development Indicators (2008). 
NUM_IT 
Number of industrialized and emerging countries that have adopted IT at the year t. Source: Author’s 
calculations based on Levya (2008). 
OPEN 
Trade openness is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share of GDP. Source: World 
Development Indicators (2008). 
PCRED 
Domestic credit provided by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2008).  
POLARIZ 
Maximum partisan distance between the chief executive’s party and the four principal parties of the legislature. 
Source: Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) [april 2008 update]. 
POLITY2 
Index taking values from -10 (very autocratic) to +10 (very democratic) and constructed by subtracting the 
“democracy” score from the “autocracy” score. Source: Polity IV Project. Database available at: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
PUBOND 
Total amount of outstanding domestic debt securities issued by public domestic entities as a percentage of 
GDP. Source: Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009). 
STABS 
Number of exits of veto players between year t and year t+1 divided by the total number of veto players in year 
t. Source: Beck et al. (2001) and Keefer and Stasavage (2003) [april 2008 update]. 
TOR_5 
De facto central bank independence measured by the turnover rate of central bank governors based on 5-years 
averages. Source: Author’s calculations based on central bank websites and Dreher et al. (2008; april 2009 
update). Dreher’s database available at: http://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/datasets/89555.html   
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Appendix B. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Obs. Missing obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
 
Inflation targeting countries (1980-2006) 
TOR_5 476 10 0.27 0.24 0 1.2 
PCRED 432 54 45.92 30.98 7.17 165.72 
LLGDP 417 69 0.42 0.19 0.06 1.14 
DMBA 414 72 0.27 0.27 0.04 1.73 
PUBOND 241 245 0.23 0.15 0.01 0.81 
GSTAB 378 108 7.15 1.96 1 11 
POLITY2 460 26 4.68 5.81 -9 10 
STABS 469 17 0.15 0.30 0 1 
POLARIZ 425 61 0.52 0.82 0 2 
FRAC 455 31 0.58 0.25 0 0.89 
CHECKS 469 17 3.06 1.68 1 8 
FED 396 90 0.96 0.84 0 2 
DEBT 343 116 44.75 49.55 3.42 447.10 
CPI 446 40 76.17 442.75 -0.41 7481.66 
LRGDP 462 24 7.96 0.77 5.98 9.89 
OPEN 449 37 61.91 31.33 14.39 176.03 
EXCH 434 52 9.95 3.07 2 14 
 
Non-inflation targeting countries (1980-2006) 
TOR_5 314 10 0.25 0.25 0 1.2 
PCRED 304 20 46.75 38.14 8.33 210.41 
LLGDP 248 22 0.58 0.32 0.08 1.32 
DMBA 248 22 0.48 0.32 0.10 1.64 
PUBOND 111 213 0.20 0.14 0.01 0.77 
GSTAB 256 68 7.61 2.31 1.83 12 
POLITY2 312 12 0.47 6.44 -10 9 
STABS 309 15 0.09 0.24 0 1 
POLARIZ 271 53 0.22 0.56 0 2 
FRAC 287 37 0.54 0.28 0 1 
CHECKS 311 13 2.94 2.46 1 18 
FED 270 54 0.99 0.75 0 2 
DEBT 245 79 66.89 33.82 8 210.76 
CPI 304 20 49.62 242.68 -1.41 3079.81 
LRGDP 314 10 7.15 0.97 5.23 9.07 
OPEN 314 10 63.06 43.99 11.54 228.87 
EXCH 300 24 7.49 3.44 2 14 
 
Appendix C. Country samples 
Both samples: Argentina, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Tunisia, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Gonçalves and Salles (2008) sample: Bulgaria, Cote-d’Ivoire, Ecuador, El Salvador, India, 
Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, and Singapore. 
Batini and Laxton (2006) sample: Algeria, Botswana, Cote-d’Ivoire, Croatia, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Ghana, India, Jordan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, and Tanzania. 
Lin and Ye (2009) sample: Belarus, Cape Verde, Georgia, Iran, Jamaica, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Mauritius, Paraguay, Slovenia, Syria, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
     
